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PROTECTING CRITICAL DATABASES – TOWARDS A RISK BASED 
ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES (CIIS) IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
MN Njotini* 
 
1 Introduction  
 
South Africa has long recognised the need to protect critical infrastructures (CIs). 
For example, legislations such as the Defence Act1 and the National Strategic 
Intelligence Act2 contain measures that, amongst others, guarantee the 
safeguarding of CIs. More specifically, the Defence Act requires the gathering, 
collating, evaluating and using of strategic intelligence related inter alia to the 
security of South Africa.3 The strategic intelligence is gathered, collated, evaluated 
and used in order to assess the attacks or threats of attacks to the security of South 
Africa’s CIs.4 In general, CIs encompass structural and physical places or areas that 
are of strategic interest to a country,5  places or areas that are vital to the country’s 
safety and security and the wellbeing of its citizens.6 Examples of CIs include inter 
alia petro-chemical stores (eg pump stations and oil refineries), international 
airports, the reserve bank, electricity distribution stations, strategic power stations, 
and water storage and distribution facilities. Attacks or threats of attacks to CIs have 
in the recent past proved to be real and pervasive. These attacks or threats of 
attacks can take various forms. For example, CIs can be damaged or destroyed by 
deliberate acts of terrorism, natural disasters, negligence or malicious behaviour.7 
Two independent attacks to CIs are described below in illustration. The first was an 
                                                 
*  Mzukisi Niven Njotini. LLB, (Vista University), LLM Cum Laude: Information Technology Law, 
(University of South Africa), LLD Candidate, (University of South Africa). Senior Lecturer, 
Department of Jurisprudence, College of Law: University of South Africa. Email: 
njotim@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
2  National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994. 
3  Section 34(a) Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
4  Section 1(xvi) National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994. 
5  Section 1 National Key Points Act 102 of 1980. 
6  Section 1 read with s 2 National Key Points Act 102 of 1980. 
7  Commission of the European Communities 2006 http://bit.ly/Z497fe. 
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attack that on parts of the United States of America (the US) and Canada. It 
occurred during August 2003 and targeted the Eastern Seaboard Power Plant, which 
transmits electricity to certain parts of the US and Canada.8 It caused power outages 
to an area of about 50 million people consisting of nine US states and the Canadian 
province of Ontario.9 As a result of these outages, an amount estimated at 12 billion 
US dollars is reported to have been lost.10 The second attack was a security breach 
in the Oak Ridge nuclear plant in the US (the Y-12 National Security Complex). In 
this instance, the attackers are reported to have targeted an area adjacent to the 
Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF).11 The HEUMF keeps large 
amounts of uranium, which is used during the process leading to the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons.12 Despite the fact that no harm was done to the HEUMF, it is 
accepted that the attack could have had catastrophic consequences.13  
 
The emergence of novel technologies (ICTs), for example, the Internet and the 
World Wide Web or the Web, has changed the rules of the game regarding the 
safeguarding of CIs. ICTs can be used as a vehicle to foster socio-economic 
development. Some are essential in conducting business and exchanging 
information14 by or between governments, businesses or individual ICT users, thus 
facilitating the establishment of our information society,15 which enjoys the benefits 
inter alia of cheaper and faster access to ICTs; the provision of digital content for 
                                                 
8  US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force 2004 http://1.usa.gov/10t19NH. 
9  Anderson et al 2005 IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 1922; VandenBrink 2011 
http://bit.ly/Yr6ok9. 
10  US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force 2004 http://1.usa.gov/10t19NH. 
11  US Department of Energy 2012 http://1.usa.gov/XmvVwl. 
12  US Department of Energy 2012 http://1.usa.gov/XmvVwl. 
13  US Department of Energy 2012 http://1.usa.gov/XmvVwl. 
14  The term information means a "piece of news with a meaning for the recipient; its assimilation 
usually causes a change within the recipient" (see Sieber "Emergence of Information Law" 10-
11). 
15  Dissimilar definitions of the concept "information society" have emerged, each being influenced 
by various technological, economic, spatial and cultural developments over the years (see 
Webster Theories 8-25). For the purposes of this research, the concept "information society" 
mean a society that is "characterised by a high level of information intensity in the everyday lives 
of most citizens, in most organisations and workplaces, by the use of common or compatible 
technology for a wide range of personal, social, educational or business activities, and by the 
ability to transmit, receive and exchange digital data rapidly between places irrespective of 
distance" (Durrani Information and Liberation 256).  
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worldwide networks,16 and the acceleration of electronic commerce (e-commerce).17 
The ease of accessing recent ICTs results in or can result in the emergence of 
certain risks that weaken the security and stability of the information society. These 
include, amongst others, dishonesty, the illicit revelation of secret information, 
corruption, theft, deliberate disruption of the system, the destruction of ICT 
resources, and cyber-terrorism.18 These risks demand that the information or data19 
recoded or kept on computers or computer software be safeguarded,20 through the 
establishment of a dedicated information security structure referred to as a critical 
information infrastructure (CII).21 CIIs generally form part of a country’s overall 
cyber-infrastructure.22 CIIs guard the various information systems23 or networks 
that, if disrupted or destroyed, could have a prejudicial or adverse impact on the 
health, safety, security and monetary well-being of the citizens of a country or on 
the effective functioning or performance of a government or economy.24  
 
Countries such as the US and Canada recognise the importance of safeguarding 
CIIs. More specifically, the US has framed a number of statutes in response to the 
attacks or threats of attacks on its CIIs. These include the Computer Fraud and 
                                                 
16  A network is an "intricately connected system of things or people." See Milone 2002 Business 
Lawyer 383. 
17  See Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 2000 
http://bit.ly/YZQlMX. 
18  For an interesting definition of the term "cyber-terrorism", see Denning 2000 
http://bit.ly/16rUw3i. 
19  The meaning of the term "data" in this context is different from that in the more usual context of 
computer data. Here the term data means the electronic representation of information in any 
form. See s 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (the ECT Act). 
For further interesting reading, see the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (2001). 
This paper argues that the provisions of the Electronic Communications Security Pty (Ltd) Act 68 
of 2002 may also be of assistance to the general scheme of securing CII. However, this paper 
examines the provisions of the ECT Act. 
20  Katyal 2001 U Pa L Rev 1003-1006. 
21  This paper acknowledges that information safeguarding extends beyond CIIs. In particular, 
information protection also encompasses inter alia authentication or validation and identity 
management processes. 
22  Okhravi et al 2012 IJCIP 30. 
23  Article 1(a) of the Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Attacks Against 
Information Systems (2005) [hereinafter referred to as Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA] defines an information system as any device or group of inter-connected or 
related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, performs automatic processing 
of computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by them 
for purposes of their operation, use, protection or maintenance.  
24  Bendisch et al "Towards a European Agenda" 1-2; Van Niekerk and Maharaj 2011 South African 
Journal of Military Studies 101. 
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Abuse Act, 1986, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, 2001 (the so-called USA 
Patriotic Act), the Cyber Security Enhancement Act, 2002 and the Cyber Security 
Research and Development Act, 2002. Furthermore, a number of international 
organisations, eg the United Nations (the UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (the OECD)25 promote the need to safeguard CIIs. 
South Africa follows the approaches that are adopted by these countries or 
organisations. South Africa particularly utilises its national key points’ security 
framework as a model to protect CIIs. This framework is set out in the National Key 
Points Act as amended. This paper investigates the South African approach to 
safeguarding CIIs to establish whether the South African framework is comparable 
to those of its international counterparts. In doing so, the OECD approach to secure 
CIIs will be used as a guide. The rationale is to establish inconsistencies and/or 
inadequacies, if there are any, in South Africa’s CII protection framework.  
 
The structure of the paper is straightforward: Section 2 discusses the notion "critical 
databases". The analysis includes an examination of a number of concepts that have 
relevance to the study of critical databases. Section 3 describes the different 
approaches to the safeguarding of critical databases. The approaches adopted and 
implemented by the OECD and South Africa, amongst others, will be investigated. 
Section 4 investigates the importance of the risk-based approach to safeguarding 
CIIs. Lastly, section 5 of this paper draws conclusions. 
 
2 Critical databases 
 
2.1 Background to the study 
 
It is difficult to give a concise and accurate description of the term "critical 
database". Any attempt to do so should probably begin with scrutinising the 
                                                 
25  The OECD is formally referred to as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation or 
OEEC. It is an intergovernmental body that was established in 1961. The OECD currently has 34 
member countries that continuously identify, discuss and analyse global challenges and 
problems, and promote policies to address those challenges and solve those problems. 
MN NJOTINI  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
455 / 536 
 
meaning of the word "database" itself. Botma et al define a database as an 
organised collection of electronic software or tools that is used to store 
information.26 This collection facilitates the accessing, retrieving and using of 
information or documents that are stored in databases.27 Databases usually consist 
of data and metadata.28 On the one hand, the term data refers to the electronic 
representation of information in any form.29 The notion "any form" is generally 
misleading. It is submitted, however, that information can be represented either 
manually or mechanically. However, this representation should, insofar as it amounts 
to a processing of information or data, meet the principles regarding the protection 
of personal information.30 The requirements relate to processing limitations, purpose 
specifications, further processing limitations, information or data quality, openness, 
security safeguards, individual participation and accountability.31 On the other hand, 
metadata encompasses data or information which describes the structure of the data 
within a database.32  
 
It is furthermore accepted that particular databases are generally more critical or 
more important than others. The criticality of these databases therefore makes them 
susceptible or vulnerable to outside attacks. Examples of outside attacks are 
computer hacking33, pharming or spoofing34, phishing35 and cyber-terrorism. Outside 
                                                 
26  Botma et al Navigating Information Literacy 84. For further interesting reading, see Brown, 
Bryan and Conley 1999 http://bit.ly/16rT8h8 2-6. 
27  Botma et al Navigating Information Literacy 6. 
28  Taylor SQL for Dummies 9. 
29  See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
30  See Chapter 3 of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 1998. 
31  Principle 1-8 of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 1998. 
32  Taylor SQL for Dummies 9. 
33  Hacking is one of the techniques that are employed by criminals to compromise personal or 
sensitive information stored in a computer system or network. Hacking is actually an act of 
illegally breaking into other people’s computer systems or networks for purposes of soliciting 
information or data that is stored or reserved in the systems or networks (see Taylor 
"Hacktivism" 61; McAfee Date unknown http://bit.ly/11d0cwJ). 
34  Pharming or spoofing is performed by a "mechanical vandal that creates a fake site 
masquerading as that of a legitimate provider" in order to steal information or data from 
unsuspecting persons and/or disrupt operating businesses (see Kapoor Computerised Banking 
16).  
35  Various definitions of the crime of phishing diverge. The differences seems to be influenced by 
the ever-changing nature of contemporary forms of technologies. For example, Myers provides 
that phishing encompasses social engineering and/or technical attacks (see Myers "Introduction 
to Phishing" 1-2.) Such attacks are commonly orchestrated by the sending of electronic mails to 
a web user falsely claiming to be an established legitimate enterprise, in an attempt to scam the 
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attacks generally rely on nefarious techniques or attacks to weaken the integrity of 
these databases. Furthermore, outside attacks commonly inhibit the quality of 
databases and data.36 Outside attacks can generally be classified as either passive or 
active attacks.37 Passive attacks occur in cases where an e-system or network is 
infiltrated surreptitiously and without detection.38 Active attacks take the form of 
altering or adapting an e-system or network.39 
 
Critical databases are collections of critical data in an electronic form kept in a site 
from where the data may be accessed, reproduced or extracted.40 In South Africa, 
critical data is that the protection of which is declared by the Minister41 to be of 
importance to national security or the economic or social well-being of its citizens.42 
This includes data that is essential to the daily functioning of an information 
society.43 Furthermore, critical databases include data the interruption or destruction 
of which could have widespread effects and consequently result in or generate grave 
consequences to an information society.44 At a governmental level, an interruption 
or destruction of critical databases could hamper and/or delay the delivery of 
services.45 
 
The critical nature of databases requires the taking of steps to preserve their 
integrity and quality. Their preservation is often guarded in ordered to alleviate the 
impact of outside attacks. The steps to preserve the integrity and quality of 
databases are discussed in the section below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
web user into surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft (see Granova 
and Eloff 2005 Computer Fraud and Security 6). 
36  West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
37  West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
38  West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
39  West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
40  Section 1 of the ECT Act.  
41  The relevant Minister is the Minister of Communications. 
42  See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
43  Milone 2002 Business Lawyer 383-384. 
44  Von Solms "Critical Information Infrastructure Protection" 37. 
45  Chapter 5, Part II, Principle A of Procl R1 in GG 21951 of 1 January 2001. 
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2.2 Protecting critical databases  
 
In modern times, attacks or threats of attacks to critical databases have become 
more pervasive and widespread. It is argued that these attacks or threats existed 
long before the 9/11 attacks that occurred in the US.46 For example, the attacks that 
are alleged in the Riggs case took place during September 1988. An accused (Riggs 
and another) devised a scheme in order to defraud a company (Bell South 
Telephone Company) that provides telephone services to numerous states in the 
US.47 In this case a computer was used to gain unlawful access to the company’s 
computer system and networks. When access was gained the accused downloaded a 
computer file that contained sensitive information. The information detailed the 
manner in which emergency calls by the police, fire brigade, ambulance and other 
municipal emergency services by were responded to.48 
 
It is furthermore argued that the hacker attacks on various databases such as those 
of the Bank of America49 and the state-owned oil company in Saudi Arabia50 reveal 
that the threats posed by outside attacks to the integrity and quality of databases 
still exists. In particular, the US Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team Control Systems Program (ICS-CERT) details the gravity of these 
outside attacks.51 For example, the ICS-CERT enunciates that a total of 198 attacks 
to some of the critical databases in the US were reported during 2011.52 It is 
therefore submitted that the interconnectedness of modern societies can increase 
the mayhem that could be caused by outside attacks. An attack on a particular 
database could have adverse effects on other databases. In some cases, an attack 
on one country’s database(s) could have pervasive consequences on the databases 
of other countries. 
                                                 
46  See in general United States v Robert J Riggs 739 FSupp 414 (North District of Illinois 1990); 
United States v Morris 928 F2N 504 (2nd Circuit Court 1991). 
47  United States v Robert J Riggs 739 FSupp 414 (North District of Illinois 1990) 45-46. 
48  United States v Robert J Riggs 739 FSupp 414 (North District of Illinois 1990) 45-46. 
49  Francis 2012 http://abcn.ws/ZwFUJH; Fikle and Fikle and Rothacker 2012 http://reut.rs/179qwdK 
2012. 
50  Perlroth 2012 http://nyti.ms/13M0EWG. 
51  ICS-CERT 2009-2011 http://1.usa.gov/16fCWxp. 
52  ICS-CERT 2009-2011 http://1.usa.gov/16fCWxp. 
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A scrutiny of the protection paradigms of critical databases reveals that they are 
generally only as strong as their weakest elements.53 Put differently, outside attacks 
will continue to take place as long as technologies continue to develop.54 The OECD 
recognises this fact, which is why it developed an all-encompassing framework to 
alleviate the attacks to critical databases.55 In the terminology of the OECD the 
measures are referred to as the structure to protect CIIs.  
 
Section 3 below is divided into two parts. Part 3.1 discusses the OECD structure to 
protect CIIs. Part 3.2 reviews the South African approach to safeguarding CIIs. 
 
3 Approaches to securing CIIs 
 
3.1 The OECD approach 
 
The OECD framework to protect CIIs has four essential components or elements,56 
namely prevention, detection, response and recovery. No particular order is 
necessarily followed in addressing each of these elements, but it is generally 
accepted that each one element builds on the others.57 This paper therefore delves 
into the meaning and importance of these elements in relation to the safeguarding 
of CIIs. 
 
3.1.1 Prevention  
 
Various provisions of the Marsh Report58 are essential to the element of prevention. 
For example, the Marsh Report states that "waiting for disaster (to happen) is a 
                                                 
53  Commission of the European Communities 2006 http://bit.ly/Z497fe. 
54  Commission of the European Communities 2006 http://bit.ly/Z497fe. 
55  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
56  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG.  
57  Cukier 2005 http://bit.ly/179q6UO. 
58  The Marsh Report is the product of the United States of America (the US) President’s 
Commission on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (President’s Commission). The 
President’s Commission was set up by the then US president (President Clinton) and Robert T 
Marsh was appointed as the chairman of the Commission. See Marsh 1997 http://bit.ly/Z4cWkx.  
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dangerous strategy."59 The real-time prevention of attacks on the CIIs must occur. 
This immediate security should be aimed at preventing future attacks, as well as 
thwarting present attacks.60 The OECD concurred, and therefore adopted a range of 
recommendations made in the Marsh Report. For example, the OECD promotes the 
adoption of clear and objective policies related to the prevention of attacks (cyber-
attacks) on CIIs.61 These policies are designed to encourage co-operation by or 
between countries, and by or between countries and the private sector.62 The co-
operation must therefore be at the strategy, policy and operational levels.63 This 
collaboration must facilitate the initiating of a practice that enables the apportioning 
of skills to ascertain generic vulnerabilities of and risks to CIIs. Secondly, the policies 
must support the aspiration to dispense knowledge and experience regarding the 
development of policies and practices to secure CIIs.64  
 
The OECD further acknowledges that the creation of awareness of the various risks 
to CIIs is one of the "lines of defence" for any CII protection paradigm.65 Awareness 
extends to ascertaining the degree and significance of the risks to CIIs.66 The 
rationale for the creation of the awareness is to motivate the design of CII security 
mechanisms that address and/or respond to the imminent risks.67 
 
3.1.2 Detection 
 
The OECD recommends that a country’s or an organisation’s overall CII protection 
framework should encompass measures to identify and classify the risks of attacks 
to CIIs.68 This identification and classification ought to extend to CIIs that are most 
                                                 
59  Marsh 1997 http://bit.ly/Z4cWkx 6. 
60  Marsh 1997 http://bit.ly/Z4cWkx 6. 
61  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
62  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
63  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh. 
64  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
65  See G8 2003 http://bit.ly/128xThV. 
66  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
67  A study regarding corresponding (or balanced) CIIs is made in para 3 (the risk-based approach) 
below. 
68  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
MN NJOTINI  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
460 / 536 
 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks.69 Emergency warning systems or networks such as 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) play a significant role in the identification and 
classification of attacks on CIIs. IDSs must operate as a second line of defence,70 
following prevention.71 Furthermore, IDSs must encompass, amongst other things, 
computer software that "automates the intrusion detection process".72  
 
IDSs must assist in an incident-monitoring process.73 Such a process would identify 
and classify the threat or risk and analyse the degree and extent of the risk(s) posed 
to a system or network.74 Once this has been done, information related to the risk(s) 
should be shared and exchanged, nationally or internationally, as a means of 
establishing a co-operative framework with the purpose of securing CIIs.75  
 
3.1.3 Response 
 
Timely or immediate and co-operative response to attacks on CIIs is indispensable to 
the process of securing CIIs.76 Procedures and measures to facilitate this rapid and 
effective collaboration should be established. Such partnerships can be achieved by 
setting up malicious packet alerts (MPAs), for example, which are warning alerts77 
that generally observe and report attacks on CIIs.78 The procedures and measures 
taken in this regard should support, amongst other things, the establishment of 
computer emergence response teams (CERTs) or computer security incident 
response teams (CSIRTs).79 These CERTs or CSIRTs must be composed of trained 
professionals80 who should be able to investigate and provide information on present 
                                                 
69  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
70  See Bolzoni and Etalle "Approaches in Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems" 1-2. 
71  Scarfone and Mell 2007 http://1.usa.gov/ZwIkbb. 
72  Scarfone and Mell 2007 http://1.usa.gov/ZwIkbb. 
73  Scarfone and Mell 2007 http://1.usa.gov/ZwIkbb. 
74  Baocun and Fei "Information Warfare" 328; Brazzoli "Future Prospects of Information Warfare" 
219. 
75  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
76  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
77  Carcano et al "State-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems" 139. 
78  Carcano et al "State-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems" 139. 
79  Nickolov 2005 Information & Security 109. 
80  Rittinghouse and Hancock Cybersecurity Operations 327. 
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and future attacks or risks to CIIs.81 Consequently, the CERTs or CSIRTs must be 
structured in a manner that allows them to assist in the monitoring, warning and 
alerting of attacks, and must be able to carry out CII recovery measures.82  
 
The efficiency and useful functioning of the CERTs and/or CSIRTs must therefore be 
continuously evaluated. Put differently, the CERTs or CSIRTs must be repeatedly 
tested and assessed to ensure their proper operation. This testing and assessment 
must be aimed at guaranteeing that these CERTs or CSIRTs remain secure and 
stable in emergency situations.83 
 
3.1.4 Recovery 
 
The OECD regards incident recovery measures (IRMs) as essential in alleviating the 
impact of attacks on CIIs.84 IRMs generally bring operational and functional stability 
to CIIs. Furthermore, IRMs provide measures related to the recovery processes and 
progression or improvement of conditions after the attack.85 For this reason, IRMs 
ease and accelerate the process of recovering information or data lost after attacks 
to CIIs.86 It is important, however, that the structure of IRMs should not be such as 
to interrupt the appropriate functioning of CIIs.87  
 
Incident recovery measures can establish the extent of the attacks to CIIs. The 
rationale for such investigation is to consider existing attack(s) trends. Such scrutiny 
may lead to the ability to forecast future threats to CIIs.  
 
                                                 
81  Rittinghouse and Hancock Cybersecurity Operations 327. 
82  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
83  Principles V and VIII of the G8 Principles (G8 2003 http://bit.ly/128xThV). 
84  Principle X of the G8 Principles (G8 2003 http://bit.ly/128xThV). 
85  Chandrasekhar "Living With Disasters" 195. 
86  Anderson et al 2005 IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 1924. 
87  Anderson Information Infrastructure 51-52. 
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3.2 The South African approach 
 
3.2.1 Background to the study 
 
CII security in South Africa is needed in order to safeguard e-systems and networks 
from outside attacks. In particular, South Africa proposes that we should have a 
"vigilant and proactive approach" to the CII security structure.88 Such an approach 
requires a constant, regular assessment and forecasting of attacks on CIIs.89  
 
It is argued that the requirement for the regular assessment of attacks on CIIs in 
South Africa is analogous to the identification and verification procedure which is 
practised by FICA.90 FICA requires certain institutions, that is, accountable 
institutions,91 to undertake the identification and verification process before 
establishing a business relationship92 or concluding a transaction between parties93 
or a single transaction94 with other persons or institutions.95 Such a process has to 
be recurrent and continuous.96 The purpose of the process is twofold. Firstly, 
enables accountable institutions to detect any changes in the activities or behaviour 
                                                 
88  The South African Cybersecurity Policy 11 (GN 118 GG 32963 of 19 Feb 2010). 
89  The South African Cybersecurity Policy 11 (GN 118 GG 32963 of 19 Feb 2010). 
90  See s 21 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as FICA). 
91  Accountable institutions are those listed in Schedule 1 of FICA. Included in the list are attorneys, 
boards of executors or trust companies, estate agents, financial instruments traders, 
management companies, persons who carry on the business of banks, mutual banks, persons 
who carry on long-term insurance businesses, persons who carry on business in respect of which 
a gambling licence is issued, persons who carry on the business of dealing in foreign exchange, 
persons who carry on the business of lending money, persons who carry on the business of 
rendering investment advice or investment-broking services, persons who issue, sell or redeem 
travellers’ cheques, money orders or similar instruments, Postbanks, members of the stock 
exchange, the Ithala Development Finance Corporation Limited, persons who have been 
approved or who fall within the category of persons approved by the Registrar of Financial 
Markets, and persons who carry on the business of a money remitter. 
92  FICA defines a business relationship as an arrangement between two or more parties which is 
entered into for the purpose of concluding transactions on a regular basis (s 1 FICA). 
93  A transaction is a transaction which is concluded by or between two or more parties in 
accordance with the type of business relationship carried out (s 1 FICA). 
94  Section 1 FICA defines a single transaction as a transaction other than a transaction which is 
concluded in the course of a business relationship. 
95  Sections 21(1) and (2) of FICA. 
96  Columbus Joint Venture v Absa Bank Ltd 2002 1 All SA 105 (SCA); Energy Measurements (Pty) 
Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa 2000 2 All SA 396 (W); Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v 
Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 All SA 411 (A). 
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of the person or people it has established business relationships with.97 Secondly, it 
identifies any alterations or modifications in the pattern of concluding transactions or 
single transactions.98 It is therefore inferred that the FICA approach to assessing 
transaction or single transactions on a continuous basis has shaped the framework 
that South Africa is adopting to evaluate CII protection measures.  
 
An overview of the South African structure to safeguard CIIs is set out below. The 
section below describes in general terms the approach that South Africa is adopting 
to assess and forecast attacks on CIIs. 
 
3.2.2 The Chapter IX structure 
 
Chapter IX of the ECT Act provides and/or seeks to provide measures for the 
deterrence of attacks on CIIs. In particular, sections 53, 54 and 55 of the ECT Act 
grant the Minister extensive powers to design measures to avert cyber-attacks. For 
example, the Minister decides on the data that should be identified and classified as 
essential to the protection of the national security of South Africa.99 The Minister 
furthermore sets out measures to ascertain and classify the data that are 
fundamental to the protection of the economic and social wellbeing of South African 
citizens.100 Lastly, the Minister establishes procedures for the identification of such 
data.101 
 
In other cases, the Minister prescribes rules for the registration and management of 
CIIs.102 Firstly, the rules provide for the registration of the full names, address and 
contact details of the critical database administrator;103 the location of CIIs or their 
                                                 
97  LIoyds Bank Ltd v The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China 1928 All ER 285 297A-F. 
98  LIoyds Bank Ltd v The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China 1928 All ER 285 297A-F. 
99  Section 53(a) ECT Act. 
100  Section 53(a) ECT Act. 
101  Section 53(b) ECT Act. 
102  Sectionss 54 and 55 ECT Act. 
103  A critical database administrator is a person who is responsible for the management and control 
of a critical database. See s 1 ECT Act. 
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component parts; and the general description of the information stored on CIIs.104 A 
description of the information stored on CIIs must, however, exclude the actual 
contents of a CII.105 The information that forms the basis of CIIs must be 
maintained by the Department106 or any institution specified by the Minister for that 
purpose.107 The Department or institution must therefore refuse to disclose the 
information, subject to certain exceptions.108 More specifically, the information 
should be accessible only to the employees of the Department or institutions.109 For 
purposes of the disclosure of critical information, the term "employees" excludes 
"general employees".110 The employees refer to as being able to hold the 
information are those are responsible for the keeping of the register.111  
 
Secondly, the rules regarding the management of CIIs relate, amongst other things, 
to the accessing, transferring and controlling of CIIs; infrastructural and procedural 
rules and requirements for securing the integrity of CIIs; procedures and 
technological methods to be used in storing and archiving CIIs; disaster recovery 
plans in the event of the loss or destruction of CIIs or their component parts, and 
any other matter required for the adequate protection, management and control of 
CIIs.112  
 
Section 55(2) of the ECT Act furthermore introduces a procedure or mechanism for 
the management of other CIIs. These other CIIs include databases administered by 
public bodies. Section 55(2) states that such management should be performed in 
consultation with the members of the Cabinet affected by Chapter IX of the ECT Act. 
Examples of these members include, amongst others, the Minister of Defence, the 
Minister of Police and the Minister of State Security.  
                                                 
104  Section 54(2)(a)-(c) ECT Act. The recording of these particulars may, however, be waived at the 
Minister’s discretion in terms of s 55(2)(a) and (b) ECT Act. 
105  Section 54(2)(c) ECT Act. 
106  In terms of the ECT Act this is the South African Department of Communications. See s 1 ECT 
Act. 
107  Section 54(2) ECT Act. 
108  Section 56(1) ECT Act. For an interesting study of the exceptions to the rule that information 
contained in the register should be kept secret, see s 56(2)(a)-(e) ECT Act. 
109  Section 56(1) ECT Act. 
110  Section 56(1) ECT Act. 
111  Section 56(1) ECT Act. 
112  Section 55(1)(a)-(f) ECT Act. 
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It is argued that an approach to secure CIIs functions adequately in an environment 
where a risk-based or sensitive framework is adopted. This risk-based framework is 
recognised inter alia by the OECD. More specifically, the OECD principles or 
guidelines contain provisions related to the conducting of a risk-assessment-based 
analysis.113 The risk-assessment-based analysis assists in ascertaining the degree 
and extent of the risks to critical information security measures.114 Section 4 below 
therefore reviews the risk-based theory. In addition, section 4 examines the 
approaches to the risk-assessment-based analysis which are adopted by the OECD 
and, to some extent, by South Africa. More specifically, Chapter IX of the ECT Act 
embodies the South African structure to protect critical databases. The Chapter IX 
structure to secure CIIs or databases is supported by certain provisions of the Draft 
Cybersecurity Policy of South Africa.115 
 
4 The risk-based theory 
 
4.1 The nature of the risk-based theory 
 
The risk-based theory of regulation was developed recently. Other theories 
developed recently are, inter alia, the codes-based theory of regulation,116 the 
institutionalist theory of regulation, the systems theory of regulation117 and the 
"Good Regulator Theorem."118 The risk-based theory of regulation is referred to in 
fields such as internal auditing as the risk management process.119 The risk 
management process is normally associated with "precautionary logic",120 which 
posits that the state should extend "freedom and security by intervening in ways 
                                                 
113  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
114  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
115  See Procl R118 in GG 32962 of 19 February 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the Draft 
Cybersecurity Policy of South Africa). 
116  The codes-based theory of regulation was developed by Lessig. See Lessig Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace; Lessig 1995 Yale L J 17-46. 
117  The institutionalist and the systems theories of regulation were promoted by Morgan and Yeung. 
See in general, Morgan and Yeung Law and Regulation 53-75. 
118  The "Good Regulator Theorem" is favoured by Conant and Ashby. See Conant and Ashby 1970 
Int J Syst Sci 89. 
119  Spencer Internal Auditing Handbook 175. 
120  Bowling, Marks and Murphy "Crime Control Technologies" 52. 
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that pre-empt wrongdoing."121 Accordingly, risk management is a forceful process 
that seeks to: 
 
Identify, assess, manage, and control potential events or situations, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. 122 
 
The risk management framework depends and/or relies on establishing the source or 
sources of the risks and/or threats.123 It extends to identifying inter alia the type of 
risks at issue, and asking if the risks could affect a specific event or process.124 
Furthermore, risk management enables organisations and sometimes individuals to 
direct or allocate organisational and individual resources to high-risk areas.125 
 
The notion "risk" derives from the Italian verb risicare,126 which means "to dare".127 
The verb risicare is used in the Italian proverb chi non risica, non rosica which 
translates in English into "nothing ventured, nothing gained".128 Some scholars 
believe that the idea of risk was seriously considered during the Italian 
Renaissance,129 when the concept of risk was developed as mathematically astute 
gamblers sought to "unlock the mysteries of dice throwing".130 
 
This paper submits that the structure of the risk-based theory is comparable to the 
risk management framework. For example, the risk-based theory discards a one-
size-fits-all approach to regulation and accepts that a holistic and elastic regulatory 
framework is indispensable. This framework focuses on the number and degree of 
risks related to a particular event. It presupposes that certain facts or circumstances 
are unknown, and that the unknown facts should be evaluated by means of a risk-
                                                 
121  Bowling, Marks and Murphy "Crime Control Technologies" 52. 
122  Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
123  Somsen "Cloning Trojan Horses" 223. 
124  Spencer Internal Auditing Handbook 179. 
125  For an interesting study on the "fundamentals of the framework for risk criteria", see Vrijling et 
al 2004 Journal of Risk Research 570-574. 
126  Deuchars International Political Economy 7. 
127  Deuchars International Political Economy 7. 
128  Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
129  Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
130  Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
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assessment-appraisal process131 which encompasses, inter alia, risk identification, 
risk classification and risk analysis.132 The risk-assessment-appraisal process 
accordingly is opposed to the idea of relying on "intuition and guesswork" as the 
basis for assessing risks.133 
 
Lastly, the risk-based theory presupposes that a fitting method of regulating facts or 
circumstances is to investigate and scrutinise those facts or circumstances.134 This 
scrutiny is commonly made by applying measures (preventative or otherwise) 
notwithstanding the absence of facts to determine the outcome.135 The foundation 
for such a scrutiny is to strike equilibrium between the taking of the measures and 
the identification of the imminent risks.136 In other words, a balance should be 
maintained or sought to be maintained between the number and extent of the 
measures and the number and degree of the risks. Therefore, in cases where the 
risks are high, stricter measures to prevent or deter the risks should be applied. 
 
The OECD and to some extent, the South African structures to safeguard CIIs reveal 
that a risk-assessment-based analysis is indispensable to the general scheme to 
protect CIIs. The sections below, namely sections 4.2 and 4.3, will therefore 
examine both the OECD and the South African approaches to the risk-assessment-
based analysis. 
 
4.2 The OECD approach to the risk-assessment-based analysis 
 
The OECD encourages awareness of the risks to CII security.137 This awareness is, 
according to the OECD, to be sustained in circumstances where a risk-assessment-
based analysis is carried out. The OECD therefore demands that such an analysis 
should be broad-based. In other words, the risk-assessment-based analysis must 
                                                 
131  Afzal, Rohaniand and Roshana 2011 ISBEIA 320. 
132  Afzal, Rohaniand and Roshana 2011 ISBEIA 320. 
133  See Macaulay 2009 http://bit.ly/14AqrQM. 
134  Spedding Due Diligence 40. 
135  Spedding Due Diligence 40. 
136  Spedding Due Diligence 40. 
137  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
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encompass the relevant internal and external factors that have an impact on CIIs.138 
These factors include, amongst others, technology, physical and human factors, 
policies, and third-party services with security implications.139 Furthermore, the risk-
assessment-based analysis is required to include information components supporting 
CIIs; information infrastructures supporting the essential components of a nation’s 
business; and information infrastructures indispensable to a country’s national 
economy.140 
 
The awareness of the risks to CIIs must therefore encourage the developing of 
preventive measures.141 Furthermore, the requisite awareness must promote the 
undertaking of steps to enhance the security of information systems and 
networks.142 Put differently, the risk-assessment-based analysis must assist in 
determining the levels of risks and must also aid in the selection of suitable risk 
management controls.143 An ongoing or periodic review structure must therefore be 
developed. This structure must assist in re-examining and revaluating the measures 
developed to safeguard CIIs.144 The review procedures must be structured in a 
manner that adequately addresses the risks or threats associated with the constant 
developments in modern ICTs.  
 
4.3 The South African approach to the risk-assessment-based analysis 
 
The South African structure to secure CIIs seems to diverge from that which is 
championed by the OECD. For example, no clear and/or ascertainable measures are 
set out by South Africa regarding the risk-assessment-based analysis. South Africa, it 
further appears, favours and/or adopts a generalised view in respect of the risk-
assessment-based analysis. This paper, on the contrary, argues that a risk-
assessment-based analysis should be a necessary component of any model designed 
                                                 
138  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh. 
139  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
140  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
141  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
142  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
143  OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
144  OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh. 
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to protect CIIs in the provisions of the South African National Cybersecurity Policy. 
For example, South Africa provides that relevant tools, policies, security concepts 
and safeguards, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, 
assurances and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber-environment, 
organisations and user assets should be collected. Consequently, policies and 
procedures facilitating such collection should be developed. The framework and 
ambit of the abovementioned policies and procedures should, however, be to secure 
the South African cyberspace structure. This structure should include physical or 
non-physical terrains which are created or composed of computers, computer 
systems, networks, and their computer programs, computer data, content data, 
traffic data, and users.145 
 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned, this paper argues that there are a number of 
barriers to South Africa’s progress towards establishing a risk-assessment-based 
analysis as part of its scheme to safeguard CIIs. Firstly, the fact that the 
Cybersecurity Policy is still in its drafting phase obstructs South Africa’s overall 
agenda to curb cybercrime. Secondly, the general provisions contained in the 
Cybersecurity Policy could be thought to support the adoption of a one-size-fits-all 
framework. Consequently, South Africans could be falsely persuaded that CIIs could 
be protected by merely ticking boxes.146 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
South Africa has made great strides to protect CIIs. The South African approach is 
one that encourages the adoption of a model which requires the regular assessment 
of attacks or threats of attacks to its CIIs. Accordingly, it is argued that this 
approach is a representation of the identification and verification procedure that is 
found in FICA. Nevertheless, it is argued that the South African approach is rule-
based as opposed to risk-based. Put differently, it implicitly promotes an inflexible 
and incongruous culture of protecting critical databases. For example, it is submitted 
                                                 
145  The South African National Cybersecurity Policy (GN 118 GG 32963 of 19 Feb 2010). 
146  The proposal for a one-size-fits-all approach to a process to identify and classify CIIs is implicitly 
advocated by Von Solms. See Von Solms "Securing the Internet" 2-3. 
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that the evolution of attacks or threats of attacks to CIIs is linked to developments in 
contemporary technologies. Accordingly, the emergence of new technology brings 
about or can bring about the emergence of new attacks or threats of attacks on 
CIIs. Fixed rules or regulatory frameworks will fail to deal adequately with these 
regular developments. It is furthermore argued that South Africa should adopt a 
generalised approach in regulating the risks posed or potentially posed by outside 
attacks to CIIs. For example, no specific provisions can be found that to regulate the 
aforementioned. Only an inference can be drawn from various provisions that are 
contained in the Draft Cybersecurity Policy. Consequently, South Africa fails to follow 
the coordinated approach found in many instruments of the OECD.  
 
Therefore, it is recommended that South Africa should adopt the four essential 
principles or elements that form the basis of the OECD’s structure to safeguard CIIs. 
The adoption of these OECD principles would enable South Africa to undertake a 
process to forecast, identify, assess, monitor, and recover from, attacks or threats of 
attacks to its CIIs. Furthermore, South Africa should accept that risks of attacks 
differ in terms of their degree and size. Consequently, a method to forecast, identify, 
assess, monitor and recover from, risks of attacks will generally diverge according to 
their pervasive or critical nature. It is furthermore recommended that regulations, 
ordinances or guidelines should be suited to the nature of the threats as described 
above. The aim should be to alleviate the impact of new attacks or threats of attacks 
to CIIs, owing to the constant developments in technologies. The regulations, 
ordinances or guidelines should generally promote a culture of protecting CIIs which 
examines the foreseen and unforeseen, or foreseeable and unforeseeable risks of 
attacks to CIIs.  
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